---
title: How a third-party chatbot cost Ticketmaster a £1.25M GDPR fine
description: A supplier's hacked chatbot skimmed card details from Ticketmaster's payment page, and the ICO fined Ticketmaster £1.25 million. Learn why the liability stayed with Ticketmaster.
canonical_url: https://codekeeper.co/articles/how-a-third-party-chatbot-cost-ticketmaster-a-125-million-gdpr-fine
---

[Data breaches](https://codekeeper.co/articles/tag/data-breaches) | [Regulatory compliance](https://codekeeper.co/articles/tag/regulatory-compliance)

# How a third-party chatbot cost Ticketmaster a £1.25 million GDPR fine

A supplier's hacked chatbot skimmed card details from Ticketmaster's payment page, and the ICO fined Ticketmaster £1.25 million. Learn why the liability stayed with Ticketmaster.

![Ben Espach](https://codekeeper.co/hubfs/Ben.jpg)

By [Ben Espach](https://codekeeper.co/articles/author/ben-espach) Last updated: Nov 18, 2026

![Ticketmaster breach: a third-party chatbot on a payment page](https://codekeeper.co/hubfs/how-a-third-party-chatbot-cost-ticketmaster-a-125-million-gdpr-fine.png)

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Usually, by the time you bring on a new supplier's software, the paperwork you saw was really reassuring. It got you to sign, after all. There's a contract that says the code will stay free of malware, a security certificate on file, and a vetting process that signed off on both. It's easy to treat that as the supplier's risk handled. Ticketmaster UK had all three assurances too, and yet an attacker managed to slip code into a chatbot running on its payment page. While that code sat on one of their supplier's servers, the UK's data regulator, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), [decided to fine Ticketmaster £1.25 million](https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/11/ico-fines-ticketmaster-uk-limited-125million-for-failing-to-protect-customers-payment-details/) . It's clear whose failure they felt it was. That's how regulators see third-party software: when a supplier's code fails your customers, the failure is yours, and only your own controls and evidence count in your defense. This post covers how the attack worked, why the ICO held Ticketmaster responsible, and what protects you against similar incidents. TL;DR **What happened:** An attacker hid code in a supplier's chatbot that Ticketmaster UK ran on its payment page, and that code copied customers' card details as they typed them, from February to June 2018. **Why it matters:** The ICO ruled that the supplier's contract and certificate couldn't stand in for Ticketmaster's own controls, and fined Ticketmaster for code it never wrote and never hosted. **What to do:** Control and test the third-party code on your most sensitive pages, and keep critical supplier software in escrow, so a recovery route and proof exist before you need them. A help widget on Ticketmaster's payment page skimmed card details for over four months Ticketmaster UK used a customer support chatbot from Inbenta Technologies, served from Inbenta's own servers. It chose to run the chatbot across its website, payment page included, calling it " [a critical part of the customer's journey](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) ." That put a supplier's code right beside every card number customers typed. On February 10, 2018, [an attacker broke into Inbenta's servers and inserted malicious code into the chatbot's JavaScript](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) . From that day on, the code could copy whatever customers entered on the payment page, from [names and card numbers to expiry dates and security codes](https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/11/ico-fines-ticketmaster-uk-limited-125million-for-failing-to-protect-customers-payment-details/) , and send it to the attacker. The warnings started arriving within two months, but every one of them came from outside sources: In early April, Monzo noticed that [70% of the roughly 50 customers reporting fraud had bought from Ticketmaster](https://monzo.com/blog/2018/06/28/ticketmaster-breach) , even though only 0.8% of all its customers had. It sent ["smoking gun" evidence](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) and replaced around 6 000 cards as a precaution, while Ticketmaster said it had found no breach. Over the following weeks, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Barclaycard, Mastercard, and American Express [all reported suggestions of fraud](https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/11/ico-fines-ticketmaster-uk-limited-125million-for-failing-to-protect-customers-payment-details/) , with the Australian bank [tracing 198 accounts back to Ticketmaster](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) as a common point of purchase. In May, a Twitter user [pointed to an infected chatbot file on Ticketmaster's New Zealand site](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) . Ticketmaster replied, "this is not a virus, it's the help widget that is found on our home page." Visa sent indicators of compromise that same month and [warned the fraud could come from malicious third-party content](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) . On June 1, an internal Ticketmaster note said the worst-case scenario was that Inbenta was ["hacked/infected and serving up rogue malicious content"](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) to Ticketmaster's customers. Ticketmaster [found the malicious code on June 23, 2018](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) , and pulled the chatbot. It went on to [notify 9.4 million customers across Europe that they were potentially affected](https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/11/ico-fines-ticketmaster-uk-limited-125million-for-failing-to-protect-customers-payment-details/) , 1.5 million of them in the UK. At Barclays alone, [around 60 000 cards had been hit by known fraud](https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/11/ico-fines-ticketmaster-uk-limited-125million-for-failing-to-protect-customers-payment-details/) . The chatbot never needed to be on that page. The ICO noted that [a chatbot isn't necessary for taking a payment](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) , and that removing it from the page wouldn't have been a heavy burden. The exposure came from a feature Ticketmaster could have left off its checkout altogether. **» Read how to [build defenses that cover your software relationships](https://codekeeper.co/articles/dont-make-it-easy-for-attacks-build-defenses-that-cover-software-relationships) before a vendor's code becomes the way in.** This is how a supplier's code becomes your compliance failure Most supplier reviews wrap up once the certificate arrives. You check the ISO 27001 badge, file the contract, and move on. But the ICO [gave Inbenta's certificate "little weight,"](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) because ISO 27001 is a security management standard that doesn't apply directly to the software a supplier builds. The contract fared no better. It required Inbenta's software to stay free of malware, yet it [said nothing specific about protecting card data on a payment page](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) . And Ticketmaster's [last completed security review of Inbenta dated from 2013](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) , five years before the attack began. The deeper problem was knowledge. The ICO found that Ticketmaster had ["very limited knowledge"](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) of the risks of third-party scripts on a payment page, even though those risks were widely documented. [Changes to Inbenta's script went live automatically](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) , without Ticketmaster's approval or any way for it to notice. Ticketmaster's investigation shows how much that mattered. It brought in four outside forensics firms, but their early instructions [covered only Microsoft Windows systems](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) , leaving third-party scripts out of scope, and the UK website wasn't added until June 6. Two days later, they reported [scanning 117 terabytes and finding no malware](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) . The test that finally exposed the script was a simple one: run a card through the payment page and watch the network traffic. By the ICO's count, Ticketmaster got there [about nine weeks after Monzo's warning](https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/11/ico-fines-ticketmaster-uk-limited-125million-for-failing-to-protect-customers-payment-details/) . Ticketmaster put serious effort into finding the problem. What it never had was a way to check the supplier's code itself. "...the GDPR requires that each organisation assess the risks arising in the circumstances of their own implementation and put controls in place to protect the personal data that it processes." ( [ICO Penalty Notice, Ticketmaster UK Limited](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) ) The ICO found that Ticketmaster breached the GDPR's security requirements under [Articles 5(1)(f) and 32](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj) . It also called Ticketmaster negligent ["to presume, without adequate oversight or technical measures, that Inbenta could provide an appropriate level of security."](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) If any part of your customer journey runs on a supplier's software, the same logic applies to you. The people who understand that software work for the supplier, and when it breaks, the regulator will still ask what you did to check it. **» Learn how to [navigate the new cyber resilience laws on software continuity](https://codekeeper.co/articles/cyber-resilience-laws-navigating-a-new-age-of-software-continuity-compliance) , so your answers are ready when the regulator asks.** How to protect your business against third-party non-compliance You can't audit every line of code a vendor serves, and you can't keep an expert in each provider's software on staff. What you can control is which code reaches your most sensitive pages, and what happens when a supplier's code breaks at a critical moment. [Since March 31, 2025, PCI DSS has required a baseline for payment pages](https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/important-updates-announced-for-merchants-validating-to-self-assessment-questionnaire-a) : an inventory of every script, each one authorized and integrity-checked, with alerts when anything changes. Beyond that baseline, software escrow keeps an independent copy of [the critical software your providers run](https://codekeeper.co/risk-assessment) , held outside their reach, so your ability to recover stops depending on a vendor whose servers you can't see. **Failure:** When a vendor's software fails, you face Ticketmaster's shortfall: nobody on your side knows that code well enough to rebuild it. With [Resilience](https://codekeeper.co/resilience) , that copy is released to Codekeeper when an agreed condition is met, and our engineers rebuild and restart the application while you keep the business running. **Attacks:** Attackers go after whatever runs on your pages, including code your team never wrote. [Software Backup](https://codekeeper.co/software-backup) keeps daily, versioned copies of the systems you build and run yourself, stored outside production, so you can restore a known-good version and show your auditor a dated record of what you ran. **Non-compliance:** A contract and a certificate describe what should happen, and regulators want proof that it does. An [Exit Exercise](https://codekeeper.co/exit-exercise) has our specialists rebuild your provider's software from the escrowed copy alone, restore the data, deploy it, and test the functions you nominate, then report the result for your file. **Broken:** A vendor's code keeps changing long after your review signs it off. With [Agentic Verification](https://codekeeper.co/agentic-verification) , part of every Pro plan, Codekeeper's Sovereign AI agents rebuild the escrowed copy in the sealed Codekeeper AI Verification Lab, with a Rebuild Report and an SBOM of every component the build used. When a provider's code fails your customers, your own controls are [the first thing a regulator examines](https://codekeeper.co/impact-analysis) , and in Ticketmaster's case they were the only thing. The protection plan you choose for each critical application decides how that examination goes. Recovery can start before the incident gets out of hand, which limits how many of your customers it reaches, and the regulatory fallout you could face. **» Compare [Escrow, Resilience, and Continuity](https://codekeeper.co/products) to see which plan fits the software you depend on most.** The fine was the cheapest part of the Ticketmaster breach The ICO's fine covered about a month of the breach. GDPR only applied from May 25, 2018, so [everything before that date fell outside the penalty](https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/11/ico-fines-ticketmaster-uk-limited-125million-for-failing-to-protect-customers-payment-details/) . Ticketmaster's 2018 accounts already carried [£3,989,000 in legal costs from the incident](https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/article-60-final-decisions/uk_2020-11_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic_final.pdf) , more than three times the fine. Run the same breach today, and every day of it falls under GDPR, in [a tier reaching €20 million or 4% of global annual turnover](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj) . That's the price of a supplier's script on your checkout. Whoever puts a supplier's code in front of customers answers for every day it runs. Software escrow puts your defense in place before you need it: a copy of the supplier software you depend on, held by a neutral party, with engineers ready to recover it for you. **» [Book a call](https://codekeeper.co/book-a-demo) to see how [Codekeeper's Resilience](https://codekeeper.co/resilience) keeps a supplier's failure from deciding your compliance record.**

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