Ticker feed
A maximum-severity vulnerability in Samba's printing subsystem — CVE-2026-4480, CVSS 10.0 — lets unauthenticated attackers run arbitrary commands on affected Linux and Unix systems. The flaw lives in the %J substitution parameter used in print commands, which passes client-controlled input directly into a shell without escaping special characters.
Only print servers whose print command actually references %J are exposed, which is why setups using printing = cups or iprint are unaffected. Samba lists every other version as vulnerable, and print servers allow guest users to print by default — so no credentials are needed. A working proof-of-concept is already public.
Patches are out: Samba 4.22.10, 4.23.8 and 4.24.3 fix the issue, and anything on an older unsupported branch needs to move onto one of them. If patching isn't immediate, Samba's own workaround is to put single quotes directly around %J, which it says makes useful exploitation much less likely. Removing %J from your smb.conf print command is stronger still.
Commands run in the context of the printing service rather than as root, so expect an attacker to chain a local privilege escalation next. Watch for smbd spawning shells and print job names carrying shell metacharacters.
Source: Cybersecurity News
A maximum-severity vulnerability in Samba's printing subsystem — CVE-2026-4480, CVSS 10.0 — lets unauthenticated attackers run arbitrary commands on affected Linux and Unix systems. The flaw lives in the %J substitution parameter used in print commands, which passes client-controlled input directly into a shell without escaping special characters.
Only print servers whose print command actually references %J are exposed, which is why setups using printing = cups or iprint are unaffected. Samba lists every other version as vulnerable, and print servers allow guest users to print by default — so no credentials are needed. A working proof-of-concept is already public.
Patches are out: Samba 4.22.10, 4.23.8 and 4.24.3 fix the issue, and anything on an older unsupported branch needs to move onto one of them. If patching isn't immediate, Samba's own workaround is to put single quotes directly around %J, which it says makes useful exploitation much less likely. Removing %J from your smb.conf print command is stronger still.
Commands run in the context of the printing service rather than as root, so expect an attacker to chain a local privilege escalation next. Watch for smbd spawning shells and print job names carrying shell metacharacters.
Source: Cybersecurity News
A critical SQL injection vulnerability in Ghost CMS (CVE-2026-26980, CVSS 9.4) has been exploited by at least two hacker groups to quietly poison over 700 websites with ClickFix malware. The flaw sits in Ghost's Content API and lets unauthenticated attackers steal Admin API keys, then rewrite article content at scale.
It was disclosed and patched on February 19, 2026 in Ghost 6.19.1, with versions 3.24.0 through 6.19.0 vulnerable — so the sites hit in May had been exposed for three months. Researchers at Qianxin XLab spotted the campaign on May 7: 156 poisoned domains by May 10, more than 700 by May 17.
Victims span universities, blockchain, AI, fintech and media, including Harvard, Oxford and Auburn. Visitors saw nothing suspicious — malicious JavaScript hid at the bottom of articles, eventually serving a fake Cloudflare verification page that tricked users into running malware themselves.
Ghost CMS admins should patch to 6.19.1 or later and rotate every key and admin password — XLab watched cleaned sites get reinfected where old Admin API keys still worked. Then audit access logs for unusual bulk PUT requests.
Source: Cyber Security News
A critical SQL injection vulnerability in Ghost CMS (CVE-2026-26980, CVSS 9.4) has been exploited by at least two hacker groups to quietly poison over 700 websites with ClickFix malware. The flaw sits in Ghost's Content API and lets unauthenticated attackers steal Admin API keys, then rewrite article content at scale.
It was disclosed and patched on February 19, 2026 in Ghost 6.19.1, with versions 3.24.0 through 6.19.0 vulnerable — so the sites hit in May had been exposed for three months. Researchers at Qianxin XLab spotted the campaign on May 7: 156 poisoned domains by May 10, more than 700 by May 17.
Victims span universities, blockchain, AI, fintech and media, including Harvard, Oxford and Auburn. Visitors saw nothing suspicious — malicious JavaScript hid at the bottom of articles, eventually serving a fake Cloudflare verification page that tricked users into running malware themselves.
Ghost CMS admins should patch to 6.19.1 or later and rotate every key and admin password — XLab watched cleaned sites get reinfected where old Admin API keys still worked. Then audit access logs for unusual bulk PUT requests.
Source: Cyber Security News
Security firm Token Security discovered five chained vulnerabilities in Zapier — a chain it calls Zapocalypse — that together could have let an attacker act as any logged-in user, starting with nothing more than a free account.
The path ran from Code by Zapier's Python sandbox through AWS credentials that had been scrubbed from the environment but left sitting in Lambda's memory, into an Amazon ECR registry holding 1,111 private repositories. One image's build metadata carried an npm publish token — unscoped, write-enabled, and flagged to bypass two-factor authentication.
That token could publish zapier-design-system, which loads in every authenticated session on zapier.com, so a bad actor could have created and rewritten automations as the user across Zapier's 8,000+ integrations. Connected services' OAuth tokens and API keys stay server-side, so those weren't directly exposed.
Yair Balilti of Token Security reported the chain on February 12. Zapier triaged it in four days, revoked the token, confirmed remediation by March 5, and paid its $3,000 maximum bounty — while committing to review that cap. Zapier says it has no evidence of exploitation beyond the research itself.
Source: CyberScoop
Security firm Token Security discovered five chained vulnerabilities in Zapier — a chain it calls Zapocalypse — that together could have let an attacker act as any logged-in user, starting with nothing more than a free account.
The path ran from Code by Zapier's Python sandbox through AWS credentials that had been scrubbed from the environment but left sitting in Lambda's memory, into an Amazon ECR registry holding 1,111 private repositories. One image's build metadata carried an npm publish token — unscoped, write-enabled, and flagged to bypass two-factor authentication.
That token could publish zapier-design-system, which loads in every authenticated session on zapier.com, so a bad actor could have created and rewritten automations as the user across Zapier's 8,000+ integrations. Connected services' OAuth tokens and API keys stay server-side, so those weren't directly exposed.
Yair Balilti of Token Security reported the chain on February 12. Zapier triaged it in four days, revoked the token, confirmed remediation by March 5, and paid its $3,000 maximum bounty — while committing to review that cap. Zapier says it has no evidence of exploitation beyond the research itself.
Source: CyberScoop
Security researchers at Adversa AI have uncovered a novel attack technique called SymJack that weaponizes AI coding agents to silently inject malicious code into software pipelines. It starts with a repository the attacker controls: the agent ingests the project's instruction file, then asks the developer to approve what looks like a routine file copy.
The copy's destination is a symlink pointing into the agent's own config directory, so the kernel writes attacker JSON there instead — quietly registering a rogue MCP server. On the next restart, the attacker's code runs as the user and unsandboxed.
That means SSH keys, cloud tokens and browser sessions on a developer's machine. On a CI runner it means deploy keys, signing material and registry tokens — which is how a poisoned pull request becomes a supply chain problem.
Adversa confirmed SymJack against six agents — Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor Agent CLI, GitHub Copilot CLI, Grok Build CLI and OpenAI Codex CLI — with Google's Antigravity CLI affected too. Most vendors declined: Google called it a single-user self-attack, OpenAI called it theoretical, Cursor a duplicate. Anthropic rejected the report as out of scope, then quietly hardened Claude Code to resolve symlinks before asking for approval.
Adversa's point is that the agents are only following instructions — but it still lists fixes they could ship, and tells teams to deny shell writes into config directories, turn off project-scoped MCP execution, and scan repos for tracked symlinks aimed at config files.
Source: SecurityWeek
Security researchers at Adversa AI have uncovered a novel attack technique called SymJack that weaponizes AI coding agents to silently inject malicious code into software pipelines. It starts with a repository the attacker controls: the agent ingests the project's instruction file, then asks the developer to approve what looks like a routine file copy.
The copy's destination is a symlink pointing into the agent's own config directory, so the kernel writes attacker JSON there instead — quietly registering a rogue MCP server. On the next restart, the attacker's code runs as the user and unsandboxed.
That means SSH keys, cloud tokens and browser sessions on a developer's machine. On a CI runner it means deploy keys, signing material and registry tokens — which is how a poisoned pull request becomes a supply chain problem.
Adversa confirmed SymJack against six agents — Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor Agent CLI, GitHub Copilot CLI, Grok Build CLI and OpenAI Codex CLI — with Google's Antigravity CLI affected too. Most vendors declined: Google called it a single-user self-attack, OpenAI called it theoretical, Cursor a duplicate. Anthropic rejected the report as out of scope, then quietly hardened Claude Code to resolve symlinks before asking for approval.
Adversa's point is that the agents are only following instructions — but it still lists fixes they could ship, and tells teams to deny shell writes into config directories, turn off project-scoped MCP execution, and scan repos for tracked symlinks aimed at config files.
Source: SecurityWeek
Notepad++ has patched three security vulnerabilities in version v8.9.6.1, released May 26, 2026 — two of them rated High. The worst, CVE-2026-48778 (CVSS 7.8), lets attackers plant a malicious executable path inside Notepad++'s config.xml. When a user opens a folder via File → Open Containing Folder → cmd, Windows runs the attacker's program instead. No validation, no warning.
A second High-severity flaw, CVE-2026-48800, works the same way but targets shortcuts.xml. Neither gets an attacker onto your machine by itself: both need existing write access to your settings files, or a user tricked into loading a poisoned settings folder — through cloud-synced settings, a malicious shortcut, or archive extraction.
Anyone running v8.9.6 or earlier should update immediately from the official releases page.
Updated August 13, 2026: v8.9.6.1 is no longer enough. The CVE-2026-48800 fix was bypassed days later using path traversal and re-patched in v8.9.6.2; a TOCTOU flaw, CVE-2026-52885, followed in v8.9.6.4; and v8.9.7, released July 14, fixes five more, including another shortcuts.xml bypass. Update to v8.9.7 or later.
Source: Cybersecurity News
Notepad++ has patched three security vulnerabilities in version v8.9.6.1, released May 26, 2026 — two of them rated High. The worst, CVE-2026-48778 (CVSS 7.8), lets attackers plant a malicious executable path inside Notepad++'s config.xml. When a user opens a folder via File → Open Containing Folder → cmd, Windows runs the attacker's program instead. No validation, no warning.
A second High-severity flaw, CVE-2026-48800, works the same way but targets shortcuts.xml. Neither gets an attacker onto your machine by itself: both need existing write access to your settings files, or a user tricked into loading a poisoned settings folder — through cloud-synced settings, a malicious shortcut, or archive extraction.
Anyone running v8.9.6 or earlier should update immediately from the official releases page.
Updated August 13, 2026: v8.9.6.1 is no longer enough. The CVE-2026-48800 fix was bypassed days later using path traversal and re-patched in v8.9.6.2; a TOCTOU flaw, CVE-2026-52885, followed in v8.9.6.4; and v8.9.7, released July 14, fixes five more, including another shortcuts.xml bypass. Update to v8.9.7 or later.
Source: Cybersecurity News
Four widely-used Laravel localization packages were compromised in a supply chain attack on May 22 and 23. Someone with push access to the Laravel-Lang GitHub organization — reportedly through a leaked personal access token — rewrote every Git tag across more than 700 historical versions of laravel-lang/lang, http-statuses, attributes, and actions, pointing them at commits in a malicious fork.
The payload was a file registered in composer.json's autoload list, so it ran the moment any Laravel or Symfony app booted. It called out to flipboxstudio[.]info and pulled down a PHP credential stealer going after AWS, GCP and Azure keys, SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, browser passwords and crypto wallets, across Windows, Linux, and macOS. CI runners were the prize.
Packagist pulled the malicious releases on May 23. Version numbers won't tell you whether you were hit, because the tags themselves were reassigned — a composer.lock pinned to commit hashes before May 22 holds, a version range doesn't. Anything that installed or updated these packages on May 22 or 23 should be treated as compromised: rotate every secret and block the domain.
Source: SecurityWeek
Four widely-used Laravel localization packages were compromised in a supply chain attack on May 22 and 23. Someone with push access to the Laravel-Lang GitHub organization — reportedly through a leaked personal access token — rewrote every Git tag across more than 700 historical versions of laravel-lang/lang, http-statuses, attributes, and actions, pointing them at commits in a malicious fork.
The payload was a file registered in composer.json's autoload list, so it ran the moment any Laravel or Symfony app booted. It called out to flipboxstudio[.]info and pulled down a PHP credential stealer going after AWS, GCP and Azure keys, SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, browser passwords and crypto wallets, across Windows, Linux, and macOS. CI runners were the prize.
Packagist pulled the malicious releases on May 23. Version numbers won't tell you whether you were hit, because the tags themselves were reassigned — a composer.lock pinned to commit hashes before May 22 holds, a version range doesn't. Anything that installed or updated these packages on May 22 or 23 should be treated as compromised: rotate every secret and block the domain.
Source: SecurityWeek
A zero-day flaw in Digital Knowledge's KnowledgeDeliver LMS (CVE-2026-5426, CVSS 9.1 Critical) was exploited in late 2025 to deploy BLUEBEAM — a .NET in-memory web shell also tracked as Godzilla — which runs inside the IIS worker process and leaves few on-disk artifacts. Mandiant, responding to the intrusion, traced it to identical hardcoded ASP.NET machine keys shipped across customer installations.
Anyone holding that key could forge ViewState payloads and run code with no authentication, provided the LMS was reachable from the internet. Once in, the attacker used icacls to grant broad access to the web directory, tampered with legitimate JavaScript to display a fake security alert, and pushed a Cobalt Strike Beacon to users who installed the bogus plugin.
Digital Knowledge changed its deployment procedure on February 24, 2026 so new installations get unique keys — but that does nothing for anything provisioned earlier. If yours predates that date, generate a unique, cryptographically strong machineKey now, restrict access to known IP ranges, and hunt backwards: ASP.NET Event ID 1316, and cmd.exe or powershell.exe spawning from w3wp.exe, are the tells.
Source: Cybersecurity News
A zero-day flaw in Digital Knowledge's KnowledgeDeliver LMS (CVE-2026-5426, CVSS 9.1 Critical) was exploited in late 2025 to deploy BLUEBEAM — a .NET in-memory web shell also tracked as Godzilla — which runs inside the IIS worker process and leaves few on-disk artifacts. Mandiant, responding to the intrusion, traced it to identical hardcoded ASP.NET machine keys shipped across customer installations.
Anyone holding that key could forge ViewState payloads and run code with no authentication, provided the LMS was reachable from the internet. Once in, the attacker used icacls to grant broad access to the web directory, tampered with legitimate JavaScript to display a fake security alert, and pushed a Cobalt Strike Beacon to users who installed the bogus plugin.
Digital Knowledge changed its deployment procedure on February 24, 2026 so new installations get unique keys — but that does nothing for anything provisioned earlier. If yours predates that date, generate a unique, cryptographically strong machineKey now, restrict access to known IP ranges, and hunt backwards: ASP.NET Event ID 1316, and cmd.exe or powershell.exe spawning from w3wp.exe, are the tells.
Source: Cybersecurity News
More than 5,500 GitHub repositories — 5,561, by SafeDep's count — were infected with malware on May 18, 2026, in a supply chain attack called Megalodon. Attackers pushed 5,718 malicious commits across a six-hour window using two email addresses, injecting rogue GitHub Actions workflows designed to steal credentials, AWS keys, SSH private keys, API tokens, and dozens of other secrets from CI environments.
They got in with stolen personal access tokens and deploy keys, pushing straight to master with no pull request. Hudson Rock matched more than a third of the usernames behind the affected repositories to machines infected by infostealer malware. The workflows sent everything to 216.126.225[.]129.
The attack surfaced when poisoned Tiledesk npm versions 2.18.6 through 2.18.12 were published May 19–21. The maintainer unknowingly published from a poisoned source — the attacker never touched the npm account, only the GitHub repo. A dormant backdoor was also planted, triggerable later via the GitHub API using stolen tokens. Rotate any token that can reach your repositories, and check for workflow files nobody on your team wrote.
Source: SecurityWeek
More than 5,500 GitHub repositories — 5,561, by SafeDep's count — were infected with malware on May 18, 2026, in a supply chain attack called Megalodon. Attackers pushed 5,718 malicious commits across a six-hour window using two email addresses, injecting rogue GitHub Actions workflows designed to steal credentials, AWS keys, SSH private keys, API tokens, and dozens of other secrets from CI environments.
They got in with stolen personal access tokens and deploy keys, pushing straight to master with no pull request. Hudson Rock matched more than a third of the usernames behind the affected repositories to machines infected by infostealer malware. The workflows sent everything to 216.126.225[.]129.
The attack surfaced when poisoned Tiledesk npm versions 2.18.6 through 2.18.12 were published May 19–21. The maintainer unknowingly published from a poisoned source — the attacker never touched the npm account, only the GitHub repo. A dormant backdoor was also planted, triggerable later via the GitHub API using stolen tokens. Rotate any token that can reach your repositories, and check for workflow files nobody on your team wrote.
Source: SecurityWeek
Microsoft disclosed a zero-day in Exchange (CVE-2026-42897) on Thursday, May 14, and five days later customers are still waiting for a patch. CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the next day, giving federal agencies until June 5 to act.
The flaw sits in Outlook Web Access on on-premises Exchange — Exchange Online isn't affected — and allows spoofing over a network via cross-site scripting. Attackers send a specially crafted email that runs arbitrary JavaScript when it's opened in OWA. It affects Exchange Server 2016, 2019 and Subscription Edition. Microsoft scored it 8.1; NVD rates the same flaw 6.1, medium severity.
Security experts warn successful attacks could compromise mailboxes, steal session tokens, and enable business email compromise or ransomware. Microsoft's two temporary mitigations are the Exchange Emergency Mitigation Service, which it recommends and which has been on by default since 2021, and the updated Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool — expect OWA Print Calendar and OWA Light to break.
Updated August 13, 2026: Microsoft patched this on June 9 — Exchange SE build 15.2.2562.43 (KB5094139), 2019 CU15 15.2.1748.46, 2019 CU14 15.2.1544.41, and 2016 CU23 15.1.2507.69. The 2016 and 2019 updates are only available to organizations enrolled in Extended Security Updates, and Microsoft says to leave the mitigation in place after installing.
Source: Dark Reading
Microsoft disclosed a zero-day in Exchange (CVE-2026-42897) on Thursday, May 14, and five days later customers are still waiting for a patch. CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the next day, giving federal agencies until June 5 to act.
The flaw sits in Outlook Web Access on on-premises Exchange — Exchange Online isn't affected — and allows spoofing over a network via cross-site scripting. Attackers send a specially crafted email that runs arbitrary JavaScript when it's opened in OWA. It affects Exchange Server 2016, 2019 and Subscription Edition. Microsoft scored it 8.1; NVD rates the same flaw 6.1, medium severity.
Security experts warn successful attacks could compromise mailboxes, steal session tokens, and enable business email compromise or ransomware. Microsoft's two temporary mitigations are the Exchange Emergency Mitigation Service, which it recommends and which has been on by default since 2021, and the updated Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool — expect OWA Print Calendar and OWA Light to break.
Updated August 13, 2026: Microsoft patched this on June 9 — Exchange SE build 15.2.2562.43 (KB5094139), 2019 CU15 15.2.1748.46, 2019 CU14 15.2.1544.41, and 2016 CU23 15.1.2507.69. The 2016 and 2019 updates are only available to organizations enrolled in Extended Security Updates, and Microsoft says to leave the mitigation in place after installing.
Source: Dark Reading
Cybercriminals have already cloned the Shai-Hulud malware, days after TeamPCP published its source code on GitHub under an MIT License on May 12. The original worm first hit the open source ecosystem in September 2025 — and again that November — stealing credentials and API keys from developers to spread through NPM packages.
Ox Security discovered four malicious NPM packages: 'chalk-tempalte', a near-unchanged clone of the leaked worm that typo-squats chalk-template; 'axois-utils' and '@deadcode09284814/axios-util', both going after Axios users; and 'color-style-utils'. Together they were pulling around 2,678 downloads a week. One of them, 'axois-utils', drops Phantom Bot — a Go-based DDoS botnet that presses infected machines into HTTP, TCP and UDP floods.
All four were still downloadable from NPM when researchers published. If you've installed any of them: uninstall, rotate your keys, delete any malicious IDE or coding-agent configs left behind, and check your GitHub account for a repo named 'A Mini Sha1-Hulud has Appeared'. Ox Security expects this is only the first phase of a wider wave.
Source: Security Week
Cybercriminals have already cloned the Shai-Hulud malware, days after TeamPCP published its source code on GitHub under an MIT License on May 12. The original worm first hit the open source ecosystem in September 2025 — and again that November — stealing credentials and API keys from developers to spread through NPM packages.
Ox Security discovered four malicious NPM packages: 'chalk-tempalte', a near-unchanged clone of the leaked worm that typo-squats chalk-template; 'axois-utils' and '@deadcode09284814/axios-util', both going after Axios users; and 'color-style-utils'. Together they were pulling around 2,678 downloads a week. One of them, 'axois-utils', drops Phantom Bot — a Go-based DDoS botnet that presses infected machines into HTTP, TCP and UDP floods.
All four were still downloadable from NPM when researchers published. If you've installed any of them: uninstall, rotate your keys, delete any malicious IDE or coding-agent configs left behind, and check your GitHub account for a repo named 'A Mini Sha1-Hulud has Appeared'. Ox Security expects this is only the first phase of a wider wave.
Source: Security Week
