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The Clop cybercrime group is at it again — this time exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in PTC's Windchill and FlexPLM software, tools widely used in manufacturing, aerospace, and automotive industries. The group began sending extortion emails to victims in mid-July, claiming it stole data from dozens of organizations, potentially including GE, Philips, and Shell.

PTC disclosed the flaw (CVE-2026-12569) on June 17, but companies were likely compromised weeks earlier. Clop deployed a custom web shell purpose-built for Windchill, enabling rapid credential theft and data exfiltration with minimal detection. Toast and Zebra confirmed intrusions but say impacts were limited. The fallout is still unfolding.

Source: CyberScoop

The Cl0p ransomware gang has publicly named more than 40 organizations it claims to have breached through a vulnerability in PTC's Windchill and FlexPLM platforms. The flaw, CVE-2026-12569, allows unauthenticated remote code execution and was added to CISA's KEV catalog in June after active exploitation began.

High-profile alleged victims include Shell, Philips, Fiserv, Zebra Technologies, Ingersoll Rand, and Apple lens supplier Largan Precision. GE was listed but has been removed from C10p's website— possibly signaling ransom negotiations. Stolen data ranges from 1 GB to several terabytes per organization, covering databases, engineering blueprints, and corporate documents. None of the named companies have confirmed a significant breach.

Source: SecurityWeek

A Gambit Security report has revealed one of the most detailed real-world cases of AI being weaponized inside an active ransomware operation. A suspected affiliate of The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service group used Anthropic's Claude Code to breach VPN appliances, steal domain credentials, and exfiltrate SQL databases across at least eight organizations — including an Australian energy utility and a Mauritius financial firm.

The attacker used Claude Sonnet 4.6, an older, less-restricted model, interactively refining commands based on live output. Claude executed a sophisticated LDAP pass-back attack, created hidden backdoor VPN accounts, and ranked databases by business value before dumping them. At one point, Claude accidentally knocked a firewall offline, then logged: "Yeah, I screwed up."

This marks a clear shift — AI isn't just drafting phishing emails anymore. It's running live attacks.

Source: Cybersecurity News

U.S. agencies including the NSA, CISA, FBI, and the Energy and Environmental Protection Agency issued a joint warning Wednesday about hackers using AI-generated scripts to attack critical infrastructure — water, food, energy, chemical, and manufacturing sectors.

The attackers are targeting Siemens S7 Series programmable logic controllers, using AI to rapidly develop exploitation tools that once required significant technical skill. The agencies called it an "active threat," not a theoretical one. Attacks could disrupt industrial processes, trigger safety incidents, or expose sensitive data.

Experts flagged this as the first known CISA advisory explicitly citing AI-generated scripts targeting operational technology systems.

Source: CyberScoop

Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs says the attack on government agencies began on 20 July, and Israeli firm Dream, which detected the intrusion, calls it a first-of-a-kind breach. Attackers used open-source AI agents — OpenClaw and Hermes — to build what Dream calls an autonomous hacking tool, one that behaved like a coordinated cyber team.

It compromised at least 85 government accounts, extracted more than 2,500 personnel records, then expanded to Taiwan's nuclear safety agency and at least seven energy companies. Not everyone is sold on the autonomy: Semgrep's Cris Thomas points out that someone still picked the target and set the objective — "it's not totally 100% autonomous."

While Taiwanese officials stopped short of blaming China, Dream said the use of Simplified Chinese in internal communications meant a high probability the operator was connected to China. China's Taiwan Affairs Office did not respond to a request for comment.

MDA says the attack combined manual operations with AI agents, that sources, methods and scope have been fully investigated, and that affected units have completed their handling. New protective guidelines and strengthened monitoring are now in place.

Source: The Guardian

A supply chain attack that exposed more than 2,000 organizations traces back to a compromised Trivy build — not LiteLLM, as initially reported. SOCRadar identified 2,188 organizations with attributable records and found 95% had their data collected before March 24, when the two poisoned LiteLLM releases appeared on PyPI for just 40 minutes.

The real damage started March 19, when TeamPCP force-pushed malicious commits to 76 of 77 trivy-action version tags, using access it had kept after an incomplete credential rotation — Aqua Security's own systems were never breached. Their Shai-Hulud worm harvested credentials, tokens, and API keys, then used stolen developer secrets to spread itself across accessible packages.

It all falls under CVE-2026-33634 — 8.8 high on CVSS v3.1, 9.4 critical on v4.0 — covering Trivy v0.69.4, trivy-action 0.0.1 through 0.34.2, setup-trivy 0.2.0 through 0.2.6, LiteLLM 1.82.7 to 1.82.8, and telnyx-python 4.87.1 to 4.87.2. CISA added it to KEV on March 26, with an April 9 deadline.

Six CI/CD platforms were hit — GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Bitbucket, CircleCI, and Buildkite — with Germany, Brazil, and France most affected. Stolen data is already up for sale on Telegram.

Source: SecurityWeek

Six US and South Korean agencies, including CISA, the FBI, the NSA, and Korea's National Police Agency, issued joint advisory AA26-222A on Monday, August 10, about Gunra, a ransomware gang that emerged in spring 2025 and has been hitting critical infrastructure worldwide. Built on leaked Conti source code, it added a Dark Web affiliate program in early 2026.

The FBI observed Gunra exploiting two Fortinet authentication bypass flaws — CVE-2024-55591 (CVSS 9.8, critical) and CVE-2025-24472 (8.1, high) — to gain initial access. Both affect FortiOS 7.0.0–7.0.16 and FortiProxy 7.0.0–7.0.19 and 7.2.0–7.2.12, and both have been in CISA's KEV catalog since early 2025, with deadlines that expired in January and April that year.

Attackers also hijacked VPN sessions, stole cookies, and modified authentication processing files on the corporate VDI portal server so that one Gunra-designated one-time password value always succeeded, leaving every login looking legitimate to the identity provider. Backups at both the primary data center and the disaster recovery site were deleted before encryption.

The advisory does carry a recovery route for Linux victims. Breakglass Intelligence found that Gunra's Linux build seeds its random number generator with srand(time(NULL)) — the system clock in seconds when encryption began — allowing the key to be reconstructed from the encrypted files' timestamps. Rebooting, overwriting, or wiping the system destroys that option.

Victims span healthcare, finance, manufacturing, transportation, and government, from South Korea and Brazil to Spain, Australia, and North America. Agencies urge upgrading FortiOS to 7.0.17 or later and FortiProxy to 7.0.20 or 7.2.13, maintaining immutable backups in physically separate locations, and network segmentation.

Source: Dark Reading

Supporters of Yorkshire's Brain Tumour Charity were emailed on 12 August: an unauthorised third party had reached Beacon CRM, the database the Leeds charity uses, and exported all of it — names, addresses, donation records and health information. Beacon detected the intrusion on 29 July and warned customers on 4 August.

This isn't a YBTC problem. Beacon told every customer to assume all data stored in the platform has been downloaded. Sheffield Hospitals Charity was caught in the same incident. Beacon put the affected organizations at more than 1 000; later reporting puts it nearer 1 500 — close to its whole customer base. How many individuals, nobody knows.

The likely way in was an AWS access key exposed in publicly accessible JavaScript on Beacon's own site, embedded there by automated build tooling. Beacon says it has fixed the vulnerability, rotated its keys, forced password resets and added monitoring, and that no unauthorized access remains.

YBTC chief executive David Grant-Roberts says there's no evidence the data has been published, disclosed or otherwise misused, and asks supporters to be wary of unexpected emails, calls or texts mentioning YBTC, Beacon or donations. Affected charities have their own duty: report to the ICO within 72 hours, and the Charity Commission published guidance on 7 August.

Source: BBC News

A critical Microsoft SharePoint Server flaw (CVE-2026-55040, CVSS 9.1) is drawing exploitation attempts after Rapid7 published proof-of-concept code on August 11, 2026. Discovered by Rapid7 senior principal researcher Stephen Fewer, it lets unauthenticated attackers forge JWT tokens and assume the identity of any SharePoint site user or administrator — no credentials needed.

Microsoft rescored its advisory from medium to critical on the day it shipped the fix. An attacker needs to know the account they're impersonating, but Rapid7's script enumerates Active Directory SIDs to find the site administrator itself. SharePoint Online isn't affected.

Worse, the bypass is half of a chain Rapid7 built for full unauthenticated remote code execution. The other half, CVE-2026-63520 (CVSS 8.1, High), was patched only on August 11, and it also hits Project Server and Office Web Apps Server — Microsoft split the fix across two cycles, so July's update closes the bypass and nothing more.

Exploitation so far is telemetry, not confirmed victims: Defused saw Rapid7's PoC fired at its SharePoint honeypots within a day, and KEVIntel sensors have logged attempts since July 19. Microsoft hasn't confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, and it isn't in CISA's KEV catalog.

Patch both. July's fix is KB5002882 (Subscription Edition, build 16.0.19725.20434), KB5002883 (Server 2019, 16.0.10417.20175) and KB5002891 (Enterprise Server 2016, 16.0.5561.1001); August's updates take those to 16.0.19725.20522, 16.0.10417.20198 and 16.0.5565.1001. If you haven't applied either, time to do it now.

Sources: The Hacker News | Rapid7

A March 2026 supply chain attack on LiteLLM, an open source Python library, exposed more than 2,500 organizations and 434,000 CI/CD pipelines — with the malicious packages live on PyPI for only about 40 minutes. CloudSEK calls those figures reconstructed exposure, not proof that any given organization was breached.

It came in sideways. Attackers took over the release process for Aqua Security's Trivy scanner via a leaked automation token, and LiteLLM's CI pipeline installed Trivy without pinning it to a verified version. The tainted scanner then pushed two poisoned releases, 1.82.7 and 1.82.8, to PyPI.

The payload shipped as a .pth file, so it ran at Python startup with no import needed, anywhere the package was merely installed — putting cloud keys, SSH keys, repository tokens, Kubernetes secrets and AI provider keys in reach. Nvidia, AWS, Samsung, Cisco and Volkswagen appear on CloudSEK's exposure list.

Public reporting attributes the wider campaign to the financially motivated cluster TeamPCP, which never targeted LiteLLM directly, and the FBI issued a FLASH alert on it in July. If you shipped either version, treat every secret that process could reach as compromised and rotate it — then pin your dependencies.

Source: SecurityWeek